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Executive Summary 
This paper summarises research on aid allocation and effectiveness, highlighting the 
current findings of OECD-DAC research on aid allocation to fragile states. It presents 
these findings in the broader context of research and analysis on how aid should and is 
being allocated across all developing countries. The paper also looks at types of 
instruments and their sequencing in fragile states. As agreed with the DAC, fragile 
states are treated as those countries in the bottom two quintiles of the World Bank’s 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), as well as those ‘not rated’ by the 
Bank.  
 
Over the past few years a dominant paradigm has evolved on how aid should be 
allocated. It is based on the now widely accepted premise that not only is aid effective 
in promoting growth, but that it is more effective in countries with better policies and 
better institutional settings. Aid can lead to higher growth in these countries and hence 
more poverty reduction and quicker progress towards achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). Donors seeking to maximise worldwide poverty 
reduction, minimising the number of people living below the US$1 per day poverty line, 
should therefore give preference to well performing countries, those with higher CPIA 
scores. In the dominant paradigm’s optimal poverty efficient allocation, one extra dollar 
of aid in one country reduces poverty by the same amount as in any other country.  
 
While many bilateral donors’ allocation decisions are often heavily influenced by 
criteria other than poverty reduction, there has in practice been a move towards greater 
selectivity, with donors concentrating aid on fewer good performers. Accompanying 
this move has been an increasing concern for allocations to fragile states. DAC-
commissioned research on aid flows between 1992-2002 shows that aid to this group 
could be increased by 43 per cent without affecting the performance basis of aid 
allocations. These countries are collectively ‘under-aided’ in the sense that they have 
received less aid per capita than their poverty, populations and CPIA scores would 
justify. There is wide variation within the group, however, with some countries (aid 
‘orphans’) receiving far less aid and others far more aid than these criteria would justify. 
There is some evidence that the international community’s response to September 11th 
has been relevant to this outcome. 
 
Fragile states as a group have not only been under-aided but aid flows have also been 
twice as volatile as those to other low income countries, even when changes such as the 
onset or cessation of conflict and large performance changes are taken into account. 
Within the fragile state group, flows received by the under-aided countries are the most 
volatile. This is particularly damaging to growth and prospects for poverty reduction. 
There may be valid reasons for aid flows to be volatile in fragile states, but the current 
picture suggests the reasons are not obvious. Non-transparent and inconsistent   2
allocation criteria exacerbate the problem for fragile states by making aid flows 
unpredictable.  
 
The work ongoing in the DAC points to a problem with donor co-ordination. On the one 
hand, we are still short of reaching a global optimal poverty efficient allocation. More 
aid still needs to go to poor countries than currently does. On the other hand, if all 
donors adhered to the model based on selectivity without effective co-ordination, the 
under- and over-aiding problems to individual countries could be exacerbated.  
 
An important feature of the orphans problem is not just their low per capita aid flows, 
but the fact that these countries often do not get much media and diplomatic attention. 
They are not sufficiently in the public eye even though there is a high risk of them 
falling into instability with costs not only to the country’s citizens but its neighbours 
and the international community.  
 
Research commissioned by the DAC also found that decisions made on volumes of aid 
to fragile states go hand in hand with consideration of the type and sequencing of aid 
modalities. Conventional aid instruments can be problematic in fragile states. The pay-
off is often very risky. Risk adverse donors frequently shy away from investing in 
fragile states—the risk of non-intervention is rarely considered. Several recent research 
papers have tried to quantify the cost of neglect. One way of doing this is through 
estimating the spillover effects from one fragile state to its neighbours. Preliminary 
results show that the negative effects of having a fragile state as a neighbour are 
significant, estimated as losses of 1.6 per cent of GDP every year. Another study 
estimates the cost benefit ratios of investments in conflict prevention. The results show 
that on average for every GB£1 spent on conflict prevention, GB£24 of savings are 
generated. While these figures should be read with caution, given their speculative 
nature, they do point to a substantial pay-off for to investment in fragile states—if the 
donor community knows how to work effectively in them. But the weak capacity and 
risk of instability in these countries requires particular attention in the sequencing of 
reforms and donor engagement. Early research results indicate that technical assistance 
is particularly effective when the government has already committed to reform. Only 
once a minimum level of capacity is reached should other development aid such as 
infrastructure investment be scaled up. At this point aid can effectively promote growth 
and poverty reduction. Well-targeted investment in the social sectors, however, might 
be important for building the conditions for reform and meeting immediate human 
development needs even when the government is not able or willing to cooperate.  
 
The paper draws four main conclusions. First, donors need to resolve the co-ordination 
problem that leads to donor orphans and excessive volatility of aid flows. Second, that 
absorptive capacity constraints in fragile states need to be urgently addressed. These 
constraints can result in aid being counterproductive or harmful, reducing growth and 
increasing poverty. One way of potentially alleviating these constraints is the provision   3
of aid via non-government channels, such as NGOs, the private sector or independent 
service authorities. The levels at which aid becomes counterproductive in fragile states 
also needs to be clarified. Third, we need to learn much more about which aid 
modalities work well in fragile states and about the optimal sequencing of interventions. 
There is some evidence that ring-fenced, long-term investments in human capital and 
working with civil society and the private sector has potential to increasing absorptive 
capacity even prior to government-wide reform. After reform efforts take off, fast and 
flexible technical assistance might be key, laying the basis for more substantial funds 
for capital investment and service delivery once institutions have been strengthened and 
governance improved. This has in part been the experience aid to post-conflict 
countries, which has been shown to work particularly well if appropriate governance 
and institutional settings are in place. Fourth, further consideration of the different 
variables that can make aid more or less effective in generating growth and poverty 
reduction is warranted. The current dominant paradigm does not sufficiently take factors 
other than policy and institutional quality into account. Yet research suggests that a 
number of additional variables, such as structural vulnerability and political stability, 
are important in converting aid into growth and poverty reduction. Taking into account 
these other factors might ensure that more aid is allocated to poorer countries, without 
compromising the poverty-reducing efficiency of these flows. It should also be 
recognised that growth is not the only benefit of aid. Prevention of instability and 
conflict, improvements in human rights, avoiding deterioration of human development 
indicators and preventing spillovers on neighbouring countries are other benefits. We 
need to learn more about the impact of aid on these factors. If we accept them as 
legitimate objectives of development aid, we need to make further adjustments to the 
paradigm.  
1 Introduction 
Does aid work, by increasing growth and reducing poverty? The answer to this 
question, based on recent research on the macroeconomic impact of aid, evidence from 
micro studies and field experience, is, in general, a clear ‘yes’. Growth would clearly be 
lower than would otherwise have been the case in the absence of aid.1 One can 
reasonably infer that by implication poverty would be higher without aid. Yet it is also 
clear that the contribution of aid to growth differs across countries: An additional dollar 
of aid to one country does not have the same impact as an additional dollar to every 
other country. Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000) found that aid works better in countries 
with better policy regimes or, more generally, that its effectiveness in promoting growth 
was contingent on the quality of these regimes. This very well-known finding has been 
                                                 
1 A brief survey of the literature on aid and growth is provided in the Appendix.   4
questioned by some subsequent research.2 There is, however, an acceptance among 
researchers that better policies, however defined, should in all probability result in more 
effective aid.3 Other studies find evidence of a number of alternative contingencies.4 
These findings have clear implications for aid allocation, for if one wishes to maximise 
its global poverty-reducing effectiveness, one primarily allocates it to countries in 
which it has the greatest impact. The Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) aid selectivity 
model, discussed in detail later in this paper, is built partly on this principle. By taking 
into account recipient country policy and institutional performance in aid allocation, so 
too is the IDA’s long-standing country allocation system (World Bank 2003).  
 
The selectivity approach, or more broadly giving preference to countries that can use 
external resources more effectively in allocating aid, is one that donors are embracing to 
such an extent that it has become a dominant paradigm in international aid policy and 
practice. Donors are in general linking aid allocation to assessments of the quality of 
recipient country policies and institutions, in the belief that aid works better in countries 
that do better in terms of these assessments. Some donors are concentrating aid on 
relatively small samples of countries that inter alia are rated higher on the basis of these 
assessments. But this paradigm does have drawbacks, some of which are receiving 
increased scrutiny within the international development community. One is the 
allocation of aid to countries that score poorly in policy and institutional assessments, 
especially those that are poor and in great need of assistance. These countries are 
penalised with less aid in a pure selectivity regime.5 A specific concern has arisen for 
                                                 
2 Studies that do not find empirical evidence of the link between policy and aid effectiveness include 
Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001); Dalgaard and Hansen (2001); Guillamont and Chauvet (2001); Hudson 
and Mosley (2001); Lu and Ram (2001); Dalgaard et al. (2004); and Ram (2003, 2004). The acceptance 
that policies generally matter is based on theoretical reasoning, micro studies and field experience. To this 
extent, much of the debate has been over whether one can validly observe a link between aid 
effectiveness and policy in the context of the type of econometric exercise conducted by Burnside and 
Dollar (1997, 2000) and not per se over the relevance of policy for this effectiveness. See Robinson and 
Tarp (2000); Benyon (2001, 2002); Gunning (2001); Morrissey (2002); Collier (2000); McGillivray 
(2003a); and Collier and Dollar (2004) for further details. 
3 See Robinson and Tarp (2000); Benyon (2001, 2002); Gunning (2001); Morrissey (2002); Collier 
(2000); McGillivray (2003a); and Collier and Dollar (2004). This acceptance is based on theoretical 
reasoning, micro studies and field experience. To this extent, much of the debate has been over whether 
one can validly observe a link between aid effectiveness and policy in the context of the type of 
econometric exercise conducted by Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000) and not per se over the relevance of 
policy for this effectiveness.  
4 These studies are cited in Section 2. 
5 It should be acknowledged, though, that the Collier-Dollar selectivity model gives more aid to many 
poor countries than is the case in practice. The model also gives a higher weighting to aid to populous 
poor countries than to those that score highly in policy and institutional assessments. Regarding the 
growth relationships underpinning the model, one can further speculate that the link between aid 
effectiveness (defined in terms of its impact on growth) and policy might not be as systematic or 
consistent across countries at the bottom end of the policy scale as otherwise might be the case. Aid might 
still be reasonably effective in some of them, and the case for reducing or giving less aid than would 
otherwise be the case to all of these countries is weakened. This speculation is consistent with some 
residual disagreement in the donor community regarding how much aid to give countries with bad or 
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‘fragile states’. These states have difficult development environments, in that according 
to conventional wisdom on aid effectiveness they are ‘unable or unwilling to harness 
domestic and international resources effectively for poverty reduction’ (Torres and 
Anderson 2004: 1).6 Nations engaged in or recently having emerged from conflict tend 
to feature heavily among states classified as fragile. Countries that descend into a state 
of fragility remain in it for decades, and the human and financial costs of this are 
staggering. Estimated financial costs, for any one country, are well in excess of the 
current world aid budget (Chauvet and Collier 2004).  
 
This paper reviews the different research strands and views in the international 
development community on (i) how aid should be allocated among developing 
countries, and (ii) how aid is being allocated among these countries. Special 
consideration is given to allocations to fragile states, as defined above. The first of these 
issues is examined in Section 2. It looks at the different allocation models proposed in 
recent years, including the Collier-Dollar selectivity model and cases for and against aid 
to fragile states. Special attention is given to absorptive capacity constraints and recent 
research looking at whether aid can promote policy and institutional reform in fragile 
states. Section 3 addresses the second of the above issues. It reports evidence that 
donors are increasingly taking into account developmental criteria in aid allocation, in 
particular the notion of aid selectivity. The question of whether fragile states receive aid 
allocations appropriate to their population and poverty levels and policy and 
institutional environments is examined. Evidence is shown that most fragile states are 
under-aided in this sense. Also considered is aid volatility. It is observed that aid to 
these countries, especially the under-aided ones, is highly volatile. Section 4 looks at 
possible directions for future research and policy.  
2 How  should aid be allocated? 
Early approaches to the issue of how aid should be allocated among developing 
countries tended to be based on notions of equity, efficiency or a combination of both 
                                                                                                                                               
weak governments, and possibly warrants further research on the link between aid effectiveness and 
policy in countries that do poorly in terms of indices like the CPIA. It is also consistent with a view 
expressed in Beynon (1999), that one should not apply the Collier-Dollar model in a mechanistic or 
inflexible way. 
6 At present there appears to be no universally accepted ‘fragile states’ definition. As Torres and 
Anderson (2004: 1) note, these states ‘take many forms, and have been defined in various ways’. 
Selecting a group of countries that fall into the category of a fragile state can be problematic, therefore. 
Jones et al. (2004) refer to ‘difficult partnership countries’ (DPCs), as do Levin and Dollar (2005). 
According to the former study a country was assigned to that group if it was a member of the World Bank 
low-income country under stress (LICUS) group, while according to the later a DPC was defined as one 
belonging to the World Bank low-income country group and was in the bottom two World Bank Country 
Performance and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) quintiles. There is, however, very substantial overlap 
between these two groups.   6
criteria.7 These approaches were not linked in a systematic way to findings from the aid 
effectiveness literature.8 This is understandable given the inability of the aid 
effectiveness literature to provide consistent, reasonably unambiguous results for 
country level effectiveness. Collier and Dollar (1999, 2001, 2002) changed this state of 
affairs with their ‘aid selectivity’ model of inter-country aid allocation. This model 
provides a ‘poverty-efficient’ inter-country aid allocation that provides a benchmark 
guide to donors pursuing poverty reduction as the prime operational criterion.9 A 
poverty-efficient allocation is one that minimises the total number of people living in 
the world below the chosen, international income poverty line. According to the 
prescriptive Collier-Dollar selectivity model, aid allocated to each country is an 
increasing function of its poverty level and CPIA score and a decreasing function of its 
national per capita income. Countries with inferior policy regimes receive less aid in 
this model, therefore, as these regimes are thought to reduce the impact of aid on growth 
and thus poverty reduction. The poverty-minimising optimal allocation is one in which 
an extra dollar of aid in any given country decreases the number of people living below 
the income poverty line by an identical amount as in any other country. 
 
The Collier-Dollar selectivity builds on the empirical work of Burnside and Dollar 
(1997, 2000), in particular the notion that the effectiveness of aid in promoting growth 
is contingent on the policy regimes of recipient countries. A number of other aid-growth 
studies provide empirical findings that lend support for additional contingencies. These 
include the extent of democracy (Svensson 1999), structural vulnerability (Guillaumont 
and Chauvet 2001), the presence of trade shocks (Collier and Dehn 2001), climatic 
conditions (Hansen and Tarp 2001), the extent of political stability (Chauvet and 
Guillaumont 2002), the existence of a post-conflict scenario (Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 
2004), the presence of a totalitarian government (Islam 2003), the degree to which aid is 
                                                 
7 The equity-based approaches favoured the allocation of aid according to relative need, typically proxied 
by per capita income levels. See, for example, Bhagwati (1972); Mosley (1987); McGillivray (1989); 
McGillivray and White (1994); and Rao (1994, 1997). 
8 The IDA’s country allocation system, mentioned above, had for many years been in part based on 
recipient country policy and institutional performance, but this was not linked to findings from the 
research community, but instead on field experience. Kanbur (2004) charts the link between this system 
and the contemporary aid effectiveness literature, showing how it is consistent with the findings of 
Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000) and other studies that show a link between aid effectiveness and CPIA 
(or similar) scores. 
9 Collier and Dollar (2002) acknowledge that donors will have also have valid, non-developmental 
criteria for the allocation of aid, and that actual allocation of aid will deviate from the benchmark guide 
for this reason. The use of the Collier-Dollar model allocations is articulated further in Collier and Dollar 
(2004). They argue that the poverty efficient allocation is a benchmark guide if a donor lacks other 
information about the likely impact of aid on poverty reduction in the recipient country and the ability to 
change of prevail over recipient government preferences (hence avoiding fungibility). This is consistent 
with the above-stated view of Beynon (1999), that the model should not be applied mechanistically. 
Collier and Dollar (2004) argue that since that ability is uncommon, the main reasons for departing from 
the benchmark are that the donor has the above-mentioned information or if poverty reduction is not the 
objective.   7
fungible across sectors (Pettersson 2004), and the quality of institutions (Dalgaard et al. 
2004).10 
 
McGillivray (2003a) advocates an extension of the Collier-Dollar model on the basis of 
some of the preceding findings, involving augmenting it with additional 
contingencies.11 McGillivray speculates that this might see more aid being prescribed 
for countries with not-so-good CPIA ratings. Whether this might see more aid to fragile 
states is a matter of speculation. The Collier and Hoeffler (2002) finding that, ceteris 
paribus, aid works better in post-conflict scenarios might on the surface provide a basis 
for such an outcome. A closer inspection reveals, however, that their finding relates not 
to countries that have just emerged from a conflict, and which might be classified as 
fragile, but to those four to seven years into a post-conflict episode and is contingent on 
the CPIA-assessed quality of the recipient policy and institutional regime. Thus, 
according to Collier and Hoeffler, aid will not be especially poverty efficient in post-
conflict countries with inferior CPIA scores. 
 
A defining feature of the Collier-Dollar selectivity model is that it minimises aggregate 
global poverty. It does not seek to minimise poverty in each individual country. 
Reallocating aid from one country to another is globally poverty efficient if the increase 
in poverty in the former is less in absolute terms than the decrease in poverty in the 
latter. An alternative approach is to seek to equalise poverty differences or poverty 
reduction across countries. This lies at the heart of the allocation model implicit in the 
strategy for achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), outlined in the UN 
Millennium Project Report. This strategy involves allocating aid in such a way as to 
minimise the shortfall between actual levels of MDG variables and their target values, 
in each country. These targets can in a sense be defined as poverty lines, but defined in 
spaces or dimensions in not only income but others as well, corresponding to the 
various MDG variables. The greater the shortfall, and presumably its size, the greater 
the amount of aid a country can expect to receive. The implicit poverty efficient 
outcome is one that equalises the above-mentioned shortfalls across all countries 
irrespective of the amounts of aid required to do this in each country.12 This will result 
                                                 
10 Kosack (2003) finds that the impact of aid on the quality of life across countries (measured by the 
Human Development Index) is contingent on the extent of democracy. Unfortunately there are 
comparatively very few studies linking aid to such variables. 
11 These contingencies have not been subject to extent of scrutiny to which the aid-policy-growth link 
reported in Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000) has. It would be appropriate that they be further scrutinized 
prior to be incorporated into a selectivity model. 
12 Wood (2004) provides a critique of the UN Millennium Project Report, arguing that this outcome 
violates the basic principle of equity, which is to treat like cases alike. The example is given of a situation 
in which it takes US$1,000 to lift one person out of poverty in one country, while in another country this 
amount of aid will life three people out of poverty. Assuming these four people are equally poor, it means 
that the person in the first country effectively gets three times as much aid as the people in the second 
country. It is in this sense that the outcome is inequitable. Wood makes the general point that UN 
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in different amounts of aid being used across countries to lift one person above the 
poverty line if we assume that the effectiveness of aid differs across countries, as is the 
case. The MDG strategy is largely blind to this point, implicitly assuming that the 
marginal effectiveness of aid is equal across all countries, at all levels of aid.13 It also 
does not take into account possible disincentive effects of increased aid. As Wood 
(2004) notes, aid can make weak states even weaker by reducing the incentives for self-
help and diverting effort into rent-seeking. 
 
Cogneau and Naudet (2004) provide an equal opportunity (EOp) model of aid 
allocation.14 This model is in part a response to the above mentioned criticism of the 
Collier-Dollar model, but unlike the UN Millennium Project Report takes into account 
differential aid effectiveness at the country level. Cogneau and Naudet’s analysis is 
based on the recognition that a country’s CPIA score (which they call an ‘effort’ 
indicator) is influenced by structural disadvantages, over which the country has little or 
no control. Not to take this into account in the allocation of aid is thought to be 
inconsistent with notions of fairness. The Cogneau-Naudet model’s optimal allocation is 
one that equalises differences in poverty risk by a chosen point in time between 
countries facing different disadvantages but making the same degree of effort. Thus, 
countries with lower projected poverty declines get more aid for any given effort. This 
equal poverty risk principle leads to an allocation of aid that minimises projected 
poverty level differences between countries by that point in time. The point of time in 
Cogneau and Naudet’s application is 2015. 
 
A key variable in the Cognea-Naudet EOp model is an effort variable adjusted for 
disadvantage. It is a country’s CPIA quintile that is predicted by its growth prospects of 
its region and its initial poverty level. The Cogneau and Naudet prescribed allocation 
gives more aid to poor countries than that of the Collier-Dollar model. Fragile states 
typically are prescribed more aid by the former as compared to the latter.15 But for a 
number of states the reverse is true, with the former model giving zero aid to them. 
These outcomes notwithstanding, the Cogneau-Naudet offers some prospects for 
providing larger shares of aid to fragile states than might otherwise prevail, in an 
                                                                                                                                               
Millennium Project Report needs to show a greater awareness of the existing literature on aid 
effectiveness. 
13 The report does acknowledge that aid should not be given to countries in which it would be ineffective 
or counterproductive, although these countries are extreme cases (‘thugocracies’) where the pathology is 
visible and the leaders are often irrational. 
14 Llavador and Roemer (2001) provide a similar analysis. However, it suffers from serious 
methodological flaws and prescribes a questionable inter-country allocation of aid. See Cogneau and 
Naudet (2004) and McGillivray (2003b, 2004c) for further details. McGillivray (2003b, 2004c) also 
provides a general survey and critique of the approaches discussed in this section. 
15 For example, Laos, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands would receive 6.5, 3.2 and 4.8 million 
dollars, respectively, from the Collier-Dollar model but under the Cogneau-Naudet model they receive 
zero aid.   9
objective and scientific manner. The key question though, is whether the notion of 
fairness, implicit to the Cogneau-Naudet approach, results in fewer people being lifted 
out of poverty. 
 
The Collier-Dollar and Cogneau-Naudet models share an important, common feature: 
saturation levels of aid. They result from the recognition of diminishing returns to aid, 
and equate to a level of aid at which its incremental impact falls to zero. Diminishing 
returns to aid effectiveness have been examined closely by most recent aid-growth 
studies. This tests for non-linearity in the aid-growth relationship, with aid being 
positively related to growth up to a certain level of aid and negatively related thereafter. 
That there are diminishing returns is a seemingly highly robust finding, with almost all 
studies reporting such a relationship, with negative returns setting in when the aid 
inflow reaches anywhere between 15 and 45 per cent of GDP. This has been interpreted 
as indicating limited aid absorptive capacities, with recipient governments being limited 
in the amounts of aid they can use effectively (Clemens and Radelet 2003).16 This issue 
is especially relevant to fragile states as they will inevitably have very limited 
absorptive capacities, as conventionally defined. Increased aid to these countries, in line 
with proposals to achieve the MDGs, could actually reverse poverty reduction. This is 
obviously a compelling case against additional aid to fragile states. 
 
Chauvet and Collier (2004) look at whether aid can assist policies and institutions to 
improve in situations in which they are particularly weak, viewing their analysis as an 
extension of the Collier-Dollar selectivity model discussed above.17 Two questions 
were considered, both in the context of the LICUS group. The first was whether aid is 
significantly effective in promoting policy and institutional turnarounds sufficient to 
take a country out of LICUS status on a sustained basis.18 Collier and Chauvet found 
that two forms of aid—support that achieves an expansion of secondary education and 
aid in general other than technical assistance—have significantly favourable effects on 
the changes of a sustained turnaround. Technical assistance was found to have a 
negative impact on the chances of such a turnaround. The level of aid required to 
achieve a turnaround, for any typical LICUS, was estimated to be an additional one per 
                                                 
16 Heller and Gupta (2002) provide a useful discussion of this issue, along with the related problem of 
Dutch Disease. Killick (2004) cautions against increased aid to Africa on, inter alia, absorptive capacity 
and Dutch Disease grounds. Note though that Gomanee et al. (2003), using a general technique 
specifically designed to detect threshold effects, struggle to find evidence of such returns and therefore 
question the inferences drawn by previous studies. They do however find evidence of a non-linear impact 
of aid on growth. 
17 Note that the Collier and Chauvet (2004) reported throughout this paper are preliminary and for 
discussion only. They are not yet sufficiently conclusive to use as a basis for policy. 
18 This outcome was deemed to have occurred if a country meets each of the following criteria: has a pre-
turnaround CPIA score of no greater than 2.5; achieves an increases in its CPIA of 1.4 points above its 
pre-turnaround nadir; and can maintain a CPIA score of greater than 3.0 for at least five consecutive years 
after passing the 2.5 point threshold.   10
cent of its GDP per year for five years. In present value terms, this cost is US$240.8 
million. The estimated payoff, defined in terms of the reduced costs to the LICUS and 
neighbouring countries (due to spillovers) in terms of GDP foregone, is US$3.1 billion. 
 
The second question addressed by Collier and Chauvet was whether aid affects policy 
during the early stages of a pre-existing reform. Collier and Chauvet addressed this 
question by looking at countries in the LICUS group that embarked on ‘incipient 
turnarounds’, defined as a 0.5 point CPIA improvement, asking whether they matured 
into sustained turnarounds. It was found that both technical assistance and other aid 
have significant effects on the time which an incipient turnaround takes to become a 
sustained one. But these effects were quite different in nature. Small amounts of other 
aid slow down the process of sustained turnaround, but large amounts accelerate it. The 
threshold at which the effect becomes positive, at which aid begins to accelerate the 
process, was found to be around 12 per cent of GDP. Technical assistance had the 
opposite effect, being associated with a slowing down of the time an incipient 
turnaround becomes a sustained one at around 4 per cent of GDP. 
 
Collier and Chauvet (2004) also examine the LICUS duration and costs. They estimate 
that once a country meets the criteria for LICUS status it typically remains so for 69 
years. They also estimate that the cost of a country descending into this status, to the 
country itself and its neighbours, is in present value terms approximately US$100 
billion. This is a lower bound cost, and based on a typical LICUS. Most of this cost, 
which is well in excess of the current annual world aid budget, is met by neighbouring 
countries. Thirty countries are currently in the LICUS group. There is also the concern 
that fragile states can descend into conflict. Chalmers (2004) estimates that on average 
for every GB£1 spent on conflict prevention GB£24 of savings are generated. Added to 
this of course is the loss of life associated with conflict. These findings do not alone 
provide a case for allocating aid to fragile states. But they would appear to provide a 
compelling case for finding ways of making aid work in fragile states, given the 
potential costs of non-intervention, and if so providing more aid to them.  
3 How  is aid allocated? 
A number of empirical studies have tested for selectivity in aid allocations. Dollar and 
Levin (2004) provide a comprehensive analysis of this issue, covering aid allocations of 
41 donor agencies for the period 1984 to 2002. Based on panel data, they find that 
selectivity is present in aid allocation, being practiced by most donors, bilateral and 
multilateral, but that it is a new phenomenon that has emerged since the mid 1990s. 
Dollar and Levin (2004) also examined the poverty focus of aid, finding that it had   11
increased as well.19 They found that the donor agencies that are most selectivity-
focused also tended to be the most poverty focused. McGillivray (2004b) looks at 
evidence from 1968 to 1999 time series data, controlling for a range of developmental 
and donor self-interests. Evidence of selectivity was found in seven of the 10 recipient 
countries under consideration. For a number of these countries it became increasingly 
important from the early 1990s.20 
 
The econometric evidence of increased selectivity in aid allocations is consistent with 
the widespread view that since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the late 
1990s and early 2000s, donors have given much greater emphasis to developmental 
criteria.21 This view is further supported by survey research. A 2002 survey of ten 
donors, conducted by DFID indicated that increased emphasis is being given to 
selectivity, defined broadly as encompassing not only the quality of policy regimes but 
also a range other developmental concerns, such as governance, programme 
implementation and absorptive capacity (McGillivray 2003a). Jones et al. (2004) 
provide a comprehensive survey of donor allocative behaviour, finding that aid 
allocations and policies have become more poverty-driven as international consensus 
regarding support for the MDGs has grown.22 They also found that donors had become 
more selective as they became more aware of evidence suggesting that policies were 
important for aid effectiveness. Jones et al. looked closely at the allocation processes of 
nine donors, finding five built formal performance criteria (such as CPIA scores) into 
allocation decisions.23 The World Bank has shown increased concern for poorly 
                                                 
19 The IDA, the IMF’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, Denmark, the United Kingdom, 
Norway, Ireland and the Netherlands were ranked most highly in terms of selectivity- and poverty-focus. 
France and the United States were among the least selectivity-focused donors.  
20 Dollar and Levin’s results appear to be robust with respect to the choice of policy index. Among the 
indices used was the CPIA. McGillivray’s analysis employed an index combining the inflation rate, 
economic openness and the central government budget deficit. For Kenya, McGillivray observed a 
negative relationship between policy quality and aid from the early 1990s, contrary to the selectivity 
approach. Birdsall et al. (2002) struggle to find evidence of selectivity in official net resource transfers to 
sub-Saharan Africa, although there is a case for suspecting that this result is an outcome of the empirical 
methods employed by this study. 
21 More recent studies, examining data extending to the mid to late 1990s, do though find that donor non-
developmental interests remain important determinants of aid allocation. See, for example, Alesina and 
Dollar (2000); Alesina and Weder (2002); Berthemely and Tichit (2002); Neumayer (2002, 2003a, 2003b, 
2003c, 2003d); Feeny and McGillivray (2004). These studies do, however, report a statistically 
significant, negative relationship between aid and recipient country income per capita, indicating that 
donors give preference to poorer countries in allocating aid. This is quite a robust result. Some studies test 
for population biases in aid allocation, finding biases against larger countries in per capita aid allocation. 
See, for example, Arvin (1998); Arvin and Drewes (2001). Note that this is result is not as robust across 
studies as that concerning income per capita. Concerns for this bias have been long-standing, and have 
been observed over many decades. See, in particular, Isenman (1976). 
22 Dollar and Levin (2004) also found that the poverty focus of aid has increased. It was also found that 
the donor agencies most selectivity-focused tended to be the most poverty focused as well. 
23 The donors were Australia, Canada, the European Commission, France, Germany, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.   12
performing countries, as evidenced by its LICUS initiative and the IDA’s framework for 
aid delivery to conflict-affected countries (World Bank 2002; IDA 2004).24 
 
Jones et al. (2004) examined whether greater selectivity had led to a bias against failed 
states and defined in terms of LICUS group membership. It was concluded that the 
potential for such a bias between 2000 and 2002 was offset due to not only the 
provision of humanitarian aid, but by the ‘increasing attention to those failed or failing 
states that are regarded as significant for regional and global security and geo-political 
reasons’ (Jones et al. 2004). Evidence presented in partial support of this contention was 
that the LICUS group had received increased shares of total aid from the nine donor 
agencies under consideration between 2000 and 2002. This is broadly consistent with 
the finding of Nunnenkamp et al. (2004), that shares of both total bilateral and total 
multilateral aid to the bottom two CPIA quintile groups remained approximately 
constant between 1993-98 and 1999-2002.25 Jones et al. note, however, that some 
difficult partnership countries could be considered as ‘aid orphans’. That is, they 
received very low amounts of aid, in part because the costs of state failure within them 
was not of sufficient consequence to the international community or to particular donors 
to justify larger aid amounts. This is in part reflected by a lack of diplomatic 
engagement, and is made worse by a lack of media attention in many fragile states.26 
 
Levin and Dollar (2005) conduct a closer, empirical examination of aid during 1992 to 
2002 to difficult partnership countries (DPC). Levin and Dollar look at aid to these 
countries in the context of their population, poverty, and policy and institutional 
performance levels. It was concluded that the difficult partnership countries received 58 
per cent less bilateral aid and 34 per cent less multilateral aid than predicted by these 
variables. Overall, these countries received 43 per cent less aid than predicted by their 
population and poverty levels and policy and institutional environment. This is a 
particularly incisive finding, and more meaningful than the shares of aid reported above. 
The extent of under-aiding, in the context considered by Levin and Dollar, varies 
tremendously among the DPC group. Some countries received substantially less aid 
than predicted and others received far more. Post-conflict DPCs were found to receive 
more aid than predicted, and this gap has increased after September 11
th. Among those 
countries receiving less aid than predicted were those that are aided by a relatively small 
number of donors. The under-aided countries (the ‘orphans’) included Burundi, the 
                                                 
24 The IDA in its IDA13 mid-term review announced that countries eligible for special post-conflict 
allocations would receive support for four years instead of three, as was previously the case. IDA (2004) 
acknowledges that further, special consideration may be needed to cover ‘failed states’ that do not qualify 
for exceptional post-conflict assistance. 
25 Note though that Nunnenkamp et al. (2004) find that the shares aid to the poorest quintile of low-
income countries had fallen from 1981-86 to 1999-2002. 
26 ODI (2004) discuss the importance of the media in aid responses to various circumstances, poor 
country performance among them.   13
Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and Sudan. The most over-aided countries (the 
‘darlings’) included Cambodia, Laos, Papua New Guinea, and Sierra Leone.  
 
Aid flows have been shown to be more volatile than other sources of developing 
country government revenue (Gemmell and McGillivray 1998). High aid volatility 
makes budgetary policy more difficult and can increase exchange rate variability, thus 
potentially offsetting any positive impacts of aid (Bulíř and Hamann 2003; Edwards and 
van Wijnbergen 1989). Levin and Dollar (2005) also examined the volatility of aid per 
capita to the DPC group. Specific for fragile states would be that results take longer to 
materialise in these environments, therefore volatility is particularly damaging. It was 
found that aid to the DPC group was almost twice that of other low-income countries. 
This result was not altered after controlling for the specific circumstances faced by 
DPCs, namely rapid changes in policies and institutional strength and the onset or 
cessation of conflict. There is, however, volatility heterogeneity among the DPC group, 
and this is of serious concern. The aid volatility faced by the darlings, as defined above, 
is very close to that experienced by other low-income countries. Strikingly, the 
volatility of aid to orphans is more than twice that of the darlings. It is therefore the 
volatility of aid to the orphans that pushes the average volatility of the DPC group to 
such a comparatively high level. 
4  Factoring-in fragility: where to from here? 
This paper has focussed primarily on the research literature on aid allocation and related 
work on aid effectiveness, taking a special interest in what the literature says about 
fragile states. It is reasonably clear from the paper’s literature survey that while research 
on policies and institutions is clearly relevant to these states, the fragile state-specific 
literature is still an emerging one. Collier and Chauvet (2004), Levin and Dollar (2005) 
and Jones et al. (2004) provide important and comprehensive information, but more 
fragile state-specific research is clearly needed to sufficiently address the question 
raised above. This initially, and fairly obviously, requires agreement over the criteria for 
classifying countries as fragile states. As mentioned earlier in this paper, a consensus on 
an appropriate definition of this term has not yet been achieved. One also needs to 
acknowledge that fragility is primarily a matter of degree, not of kind. One should not, 
however, become bogged down on this issue as that mitigates against further research 
and policy development and implementation. A reasonably expedient, but seemingly 
valid approach is that adopted by the DAC, which assigns the fragile state classification 
to a country if it is in the bottom two quintiles of the CPIA or has not been rated by the 
World Bank. 
 
The key questions that then need to be addressed are whether aid, in all of its current or 
historical forms, is either ineffective or not sufficiently effective in fragile states, as 
defined, and if so, how can it be made to work more effectively in them. Collier and 
Chauvet (2004) provide an insightful response to this question, by looking at the impact 
of aid on policy and institutional reform. One might infer from their results that by   14
being positively associated with such reform, aid to fragile states can be justified on 
effectiveness criteria. But their analysis is a partial one, to the extent that it does not 
look at this relationship in the context of a selectivity model, nor relatedly does it look 
at implications for growth and poverty reduction. It is also a preliminary one, requiring 
further investigation.  
 
Answering the preceding questions should provide subsequent information on whether 
these countries are under- or over-aided and, in particular, on their absorptive capacities. 
It might also tell us, for example, whether the augmentation of the Collier-Dollar 
selectivity or Cogneau-Naudet EOp models, discussed in this paper, would see changes 
in aid allocations prescribed for fragile states. Augmenting the selectivity model, for 
instance, would see more aid to fragile states if they are characterised by stable political 
regimes, trade shocks, structural vulnerability and the other characteristics mentioned 
above. Such an augmentation rests on results from research on links between aid and 
growth. But it needs to be recognised that growth is not the only potential benefit of aid. 
Prevention of instability and conflict, improvements in human rights, avoiding 
deterioration of human development indicators and preventing spillovers on 
neighbouring countries are other benefits. We need to learn more about the impact of 
aid on these factors, especially as they apply to fragile states.  
 
Donors can factor-in the results of this research as they become available. But they need 
to move more quickly than this given the magnitude of issues faced with respect to 
fragile states, the costs of conflict prevention and a return to violent conflict among 
them. Three issues emerge.  
 
The first concerns the issue of under- and over-aided fragile states (the orphans and 
darlings, respectively) needs to be addressed. This could involve consideration of: 
(i)  donors agreeing on an annual discussion of their ‘partner country’ lists to 
establish where some countries are in danger of losing all or almost all bilateral 
partners; 
(ii)  compensatory multilateral mechanisms, with some multilateral agencies playing 
the role of residual by balancing out the decisions of others;  
(iii)  more explicit tasking and training of diplomatic missions in development 
dialogue, and;  
(iv)  use of mechanisms such as the proposed UN peace-building commission to 
maintain a focus on orphans. 
 
Second, aid volatility to fragile states must be checked, especially in the case of the 
under-aided fragile states, the aid orphans. This is both a matter of individual donors 
being more conscious of year-on-year variation in aid allocations, but also for greater 
co-ordination among donors. This co-ordination could involve: 
(i)  longer term partnership agreements, possibly facilitated through sector programs; 
and    15
(ii)  compensatory multilateral mechanisms, specifically focused on sector programs 
in the ‘long-term’ sectors such as health and education, allowing other types of 
aid to be more variable. 
 
Third, diminishing aid returns and related absorptive capacity constraints need to be 
addressed urgently. The literature on aid tends to assume that all aid is provided via 
governments, or that donors work with governments rather than working around them. 
Empirical evidence of diminishing returns is based almost entirely on aid flows which 
have gone to recipient country governments. Diminishing returns will in principle 
always be an issue in all countries; an economy can only efficiently absorb aid up to a 
particular level. But clarity is required over the saturation levels of aid that apply in 
fragile states, and ways of increasing the optimal share of aid in GDP need to be 
considered. One method of addressing the second of these issues is to allocate aid via 
non-government channels, such as NGOs, the private sector or ’independent service 
authorities’. It can be the case that operating through these channels can make aid 
effective even when policy and institutional settings are deficient, prior to 
reforms.These channels have been considered in the literature (see World Bank 2002; 
ODI 2004; Collier 2002; Collier and Dollar 2004). One can and should explore these 
channels further, as they apply to fragile states.    16
Appendix 
Aid and growth: a brief literature survey 
For many decades the research literature on the country-level impacts of aid often sent 
ambiguous messages as to whether aid was effective in promoting growth and reducing 
poverty. A number of widely cited empirical studies found no evidence that aid 
contributed to higher growth, while influential writers often provided damning 
qualitative accounts of aid. The empirical studies include Voivodas (1973), Mosley 
(1980), Mosley et al. (1987) and Boone (1996). Arguably the best known author critical 
of aid on qualitative grounds is the late Lord Bauer (see Bauer 1981, 1991). The overall 
consensus about these impacts was rather pessimistic. This, combined with strong 
evidence that projects were in general effective in attaining their intended outcomes, led 
to the well-known ‘micro-macro paradox’ of aid (Mosley 1986).  
 
The late 1990s saw a fundamental change in the literature and aid and growth. 
Commencing with the publication of the seminal research of Burnside and Dollar 
(1997), a new stream of empirical studies has emerged that provides a clear, 
unambiguous message that aid increases growth. This has proved to be an especially 
robust research finding drawn by practically all of the increasingly large number of 
empirical studies of aid and growth post-Burnside and Dollar (1997). This is clear, as a 
number of recent surveys of the aid-growth and related literatures attest. These include 
Hansen and Tarp (2000); Beynon (2001, 2002); Morrissey (2001); Hermes and Lensink 
(2001); McGillivray (2003a, 2004a). McGillivray (2004) identifies 35 studies empirical 
aid-growth studies that have been conducted since Burnside and Dollar (1997) Each 
these studies provide original empirical results, obtained from either new or updated 
data sets, similar data sets but employing different empirical methods or both. Thirty-
three of these studies find evidence that aid works. The two studies that fail to find this 
evidence do not reject the proposition that aid increases growth, but simply that in the 
context of a Burnside and Dollar analysis of aid one cannot observe a relationship 
between aid and growth.  
 
Roodman (2004) points to the results of some of these studies being fragile, but does 
not per se reject the conclusion that aid and growth are positively associated. Full 
bibliographic details of all 35 studies can be found in McGillivray (2004a). Clemens et 
al. (2004) cite an additional eleven studies that McGillivray (2004a) does not. Seven of 
these studies find that aid and growth are positively related. One finds no relationship 
between these variables and two find that the relationship is negative. Clemens et al. 
(2004) criticise the methods used by those three studies (very heavily so in the case of 
the two reporting the negative relationship), to such an extent that their results should be 
treated with great caution. The well-known macro-micro paradox of aid would appear to 
be dead and buried, well and truly. 
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The demise of the macro-micro paradox should imply that aid no longer has its critics. 
A number of researchers have in fact criticised aid on empirical grounds. Easterly 
(2003), Ovaska (2003) and Brumm (2003), are among them. They are the three studies 
cited in Clemens et al. (2004) that provide unfavourable accounts of aid effectiveness. 
Some so far as to claim that aid is actually harmful. Data showing increased aid flows 
and at broadly the same time decreased growth rates are often used to support this claim 
(see Easterly 2003, for example). The real issue is not whether growth has declined, but 
whether these declines would have been lower in the absence of aid.  
 
Some critics point to problems in aid delivery, such as fungibility, donor proliferation, 
lack of harmonization and tying, citing them as reasons for the failure of aid. These 
problems are real, and it is valid to criticize aid delivery on the basis of them. But in 
their proper context, they point to why aid might not have work better, rather than not 
having worked at all (McGillivray 2004a). Moreover, as mentioned above, the literature 
is now very clear in its finding that aid works. While one should always express a 
degree of skepticism over the findings of most empirical studies, especially econometric 
analyses of panel data, as Roodman (2004) very skillfully does, the sheer weight of 
evidence emerging from the literature is such that one can clearly reject the hypothesis 
that aid, on aggregate, has no beneficial impact on or is harmful for growth. The only 
context in which this one should not reject this hypothesis is if aid inflows are of such a 
large magnitude that negative returns prevail, to such an extent that they outweigh any 
positive impact. This would appear to be a case for improving recipient country 
absorptive capacities and/or reducing aid to manageable levels, not eliminating it 
entirely. 
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